It is Blackhat/Defcon time so it should not surprise anyone that the media is full of hacks. While the hackers pretend to demonstrate that the security mechanism is useless, most of the attacks are so expensive as to be impractical. What they really demonstrate is the limitations of the mechanism. Regular readers of this blog know that all security mechanisms have limitations; understanding those limitations are part of our stock in trade and I write about them often.
A recent demonstration spoofed Apple's FaceID in only "120 seconds," as though that were the only cost of attack. They omitted the special knowledge and access. A recent article in BankInfoSecurityNews raised alarms over the discovery of a database of fingerprint images for sale.
First, keep in mind that biometrics are really about convenience, not security. That is why they are best used as one factor in multi-factor systems.
Second, they do not rely upon the secrecy of the reference but upon their resistance, at least in context, to counterfeiting. Your visage is an authenticator for your drivers license. It is public information. While a photograph of you might be able to fool a computer, no other person would be likely to confuse the photo with you. There is too little information in the photo for it to be mistaken for you. The more information that the implementation uses, the lower the risk of false positives but the higher that of false negatives and the more power and time required for a check.
Finally, as this article suggests, just like passwords, biometrics are fundamentally vulnerable to spoofing and replay attacks; implementations must resist them. For example, Apple's FaceID uses tests of "liveness" to distinguish between a real person and a photo of the person or a replay of an earlier submission. Perhaps they are better used on mobiles, where possesion of the mobile is one factor and where the instant data is compared to the reference locally and does not go across a network where it could be captured for replay.