Showing posts with label insider risk. Show all posts
Showing posts with label insider risk. Show all posts

Friday, May 16, 2025

Insider Risk (not Threat)

Over the last decade the media has been full of "threat," almost to the exclusion of "risk."  It should not surprise anyone that insider risk has been written of as "insider threat."  It is true there is a small threat from insiders but it has a very low rate of occurrence.  The real concern for insiders arises from consequences, not threat.  The high rate threat comes from outside, not inside.  Outsiders damage the brand: insiders bring down the business.  The threat is from the outside, risk from the inside.

Most of our employees really do want to do their jobs.  In the rare cases where they fail it is more likely to be accidental rather than malicious.  "The dummies have it, hands down, now and forever."  No matter how damaging, mistakes tend be overlooked, accepted as normal and unavoidable, and forgiven.  Even malice is more likely because of a management failure to train,  supervise, and reward, rather than a failure of motive on the part of the employees.  

Conrad Hilton, the founder of Hilton Hotels, used to display in his guest rooms what he called the  Eleventh Commandment, "Thou shalt not tempt."  My favorite ethical test is, "Nice people do not do that."  I learned my second favorite ethical test at Nortel in Canada.  When i asked my client to describe Nortel's ethical culture he said, "Behave as though your mother were watching."  Good managers watch like "Mother."  

Malicious insiders may be needy, greedy, or disgruntled.  The needy or greedy resort to fraud and embezzlement, while the disgruntled lean toward destruction.  Even the fraud may be rooted in part by a failure ot management to properly address error.  The employee makes a mistake; no one notices.  He repeats it and again no one notices.  He begins to think that a deliberate act, one in the direction of his benefit, may similarly go unnoticed.  

Watch for good numbers.  If the numbers are too good to be true, they are not true.  

The disgruntled employee is most likely upset because he believes that his worth and his contribution to the enterprise have not been properly recognized and rewarded.  However, that feeling did not occur suddenly,  He did not go home happy on Tuesday night and come in and take the place apart on Wednesday morning,  The disaffection grew slowly over time.  It likely did not go unnoticed.  His managers likely knew that he was not happy but had delayed taking action until it was too late.   Perhaps please, thank you, and attaboys are the most efficient controls.  While not a substitute for proper compensation, they do not cost much.  

Speaking of proper compensation, the higher up the management chain, the more important it becomes.  It must take into account the economic contribution of the scope managed.  It must also take into account the economic discretion that the officer exercises.  One of the reasons that we see corruption in government is that officials are not compensated in proportion to the power and influence that they exercise.  While such compensation may be hard to justify politically, it does work to limit corruption.

While management tends to worry about IT, and IT failures get the media attention, most fraud takes place in business applications.  Workers steal where they work, e.g., accounts payable and receivable, payroll, goods, inventory, credit.  IT people are more likely to convert capacity than to manipulate business applications.  

While management tends to focus on those engaged in low level routine, think clerks and tellers, the real damage comes from officers and professionals.  Tellers steal small and are caught early.  Officers steal big and may not be caught for years.  However, one must take into account the power and fragility of IT, when managing employee satisfaction and morale.  

Few embezzlers started out to steal big.  They started small but it was not detected: temptation. It became habitual and grew in magnitude over time.  Early detection and correction is essential.  

One last thought before we go.  The most effective control over insider risk is management supervision.  Everyone deserves to be supervised by someone who knows enough to understand and appreciate what they do.  On the other hand, automated controls and procedures are often more efficient than expensive supervision.  While we use them because they are efficient, they are effective only in the presence of good management.  They are hardly ever effective in controlling managers and executives.  

In summary, think risk not threat, error before malice, business before  IT, managers and executives before tellers and clerks, supervision before automation.  

 

Monday, March 8, 2021

Separation of Duties

One of our most efficient controls over insiders is to involve multiple parties in sensitive duties.  We assign roles and duties in such a way that: 

  • individuals, simply by doing their job, act as a control upon others  
  • increases the probability that errors will be detected and corrected
  • such as to limit temptation or the ability to commit fraud
  • such that cooperation would be required to both convert an asset and conceal that conversion. 
  • so as to improve transparency and accountability 
We separate management from staff, that is, execution from setting objectives, measurement, and reporting.  

We separate the Information Technology function and application development from their managers and users.  

Within Information Technology we may separate:

  • Data Entry
  • Operations
  • System Architecture
  • System Programming
  • Application Design
  • Application Coding
  • Program Testing
  • Maintenance 
  • Management
  • Other


The little monks, specifically Luca Pacioli and his colleagues, that documented the idea of  double-entry bookkeeping in the late 15th Century, suggested certain minimum rules that we use today as tests.  

They suggested that the individual who creates and authorizes an account should be separate from the ones who processes transactions within the account.  For example, the person who assigns the account number for a new customer or vendor, and enters the descriptive information like name, address, Duns number, credit information etc. should be separate from the person who processes debits and credits.  Normally, managers or officers authorize new accounts while clerks, cashiers, or tellers process orders, payments, deposits and withdrawals.  

Applying these tests to program development suggests that:

  • authorizing, naming, and specifying a program
  • be separated from coding
  • testing
  • acceptance
  • operation
  • execution
  • use
  • and maintenance 

can be usefully separated.







Tuesday, July 16, 2019

Privileged Access Management

In its Private Industry Notification (20190423-001) the FBI specifically called out the risk represented by privileged users, those people who configure and manage networks, systems, applications, and users, those with administrator (e.g., "root," "ADMIN") pivileges.  These users are problematic because they can both expand their privileges and hide their use.  For example, an administrator might create a phony user ID to use to hide his activity or to use after termination.  The most egregious example might be the abuse by Edward Snowden who expanded his privileges to exfiltrate dozens of documents over months from the NSA without being detected.  

At the primitive level, most privileges are associated with a user identifier and a reuseable password.  In order to provide coverage, these are often known to and used by multiple parties with a subsequent loss of accountability, just where we need it most.        

However, there are solutions, called Privileged Access Management (PAM) packages, that can be used to provide some automated control and accountability over these users.  These applications work by acting as proxies for the privileged controls, hiding them, controlling access to them, and recording their use.  Instead of connecting directly to the privileged controls, the administrator connects to the proxy which then connects him to the privileged control.  

These packages may provide:

  • hiding of all privlleged controls
  • strong authentication of privileged users
  • management control over the granting and withdrawing of privileges
  • logging of all connections, events, and uses, content.
  • multi-party controls (two or more people must cooperate)
  • restriction of use to a time of day or shift
  • restriction of use to specified (e.g., supervised) locations (e.g., device, network address, VPN, VLAN)
  • restriction to a single user at a time (checkout/checkin) 
  • other
The PAM becomes the sole process with access to the privileges and uses them on behalf of its user as directed by management or policy.  


If your enterprise, network, system, or application has only one privileged user or administrator, then you have good accountability;  whatever was done, that person did it.  However, that will apply to only very small enterprises.  Everyone else should be using a Privileged Access Manager.  There are now dozens on the market.  Choosing the right one will require some effort but the usual sources (e.g., Gartner, Capterra, Solutions Review) will assist you.