Thursday, March 7, 2019

Interview in the Communications of the ACM

In this article, I argue that there is a significant difference between today’s state of security practice, in which convenience trumps security, and the real requirements.  The current practice leaves us vulnerable to the threat sources and their attack methods that we are seeing.  I make a number of recommendations for changes to the practice.

Friday, February 15, 2019

The Desktop, our Achilles Heel

During the last three or four years the number and rate of enterpirse wide breaches have increased dramatically.  Successful attacks have relied upon duping users into clicking on bait malicious objects in e-mail messages and web pages.  The malicious objects capture user credentials and then use them to attack peer systems in the enterprise network, spreading the compromise laterally.  These attacks exploit user gullibility, re-usable credentials, the default desktop access control rule of ”read/write,”  and flat enterprise networks.  Therefore, many security practitioners recommend user training, multi-factor user authentication, and structured networks.  Resistance to all three of these measures is high and their effectiveness limited.  Moreover, they do not address the vulnerability of the desktops to have their procedures modified by their data.   We are left with a high level of risk.

E-mail and browsing are the Achilles Heel of the desktop and the desktop is the Achilles Heel of the enterprise.  One of these two applications are involved in a large percentage of all breaches.  Note that while Achilles was vulnerable on only one heel, small attack surface, the enterprise may be vulnerable on many desktops.                                                            

One obvious defense would be to isolate these two applications from the system on which they run and those systems from the other applications and systems of the enterprise.  Neither of those applications should have the capability to make persistent changes to the procedures of the systems on which they run.  

In a world of cheap hardware, one way to do this would be to run these two applications on sacrifical hardware dedicated to these two applications.  In a world of reliable process-to-process isolation, another would be to use that isolation to protect the system on which the applications run from any changes originating in those porous applications.  The first solution is resisted because IT culture sees hardware as expensive, this in spite of the fact that its cost halves every two years.  The second is resisted because user culture prefers convenience, generality, flexiblity, and ”dancing pigs” to security.  As a consequence, most desktops are configured to offer read-write access to most objects and  few provide reliable protective isolation.  

It does not have to be this way.  Ten years ago Steve Jobs and Apple introduced us to iOS, with very limited capabilities but with very strong process-to-process isolation and strong protection from anything done at the user interface.  As it has matured its capabilities have increased.  Controlled application-to-application communication has been introduced while maintaining strong isolation and protection.  Some generality and flexibility have been sacrificed to usability and security but less than the defenders of the status quo predicted.  Nonetheless, resistance to iOS was so strong that it provoked Android, a more traditional system.  

However, iOS has been adopted by a large population of users that enjoy ”most, but not all, of the benefits offered by the traditional general purpose system.” (Fred Cohen)  At the user application interface, it appears as a single user single application-only machine.  While it can maintain application state, iOS is resistant to any persistent change to itself from the application or the user.  

Said another way, iOS protects itself from its data, its user, and its user’s data.  While the application may be vulnerable to a ”bait” attack, the system is not.  Therefore, it is a preferred environment in which to run vulnerable applications like e-mail and browsing, and sensitive applications like banking and healthcare.   

Personal computers can be configured with hypervisors to provide strong process to process isolation.  They can be configured with the ”least privilege” access control rule to resist contamination of procedures by their data.  Said another way, they can be configured such that simply clicking on a bait object is not sufficient to compromise the system.  Indeed they can even be configured in such a way that, as in iOS, nothing done with the keyboard and mouse is sufficient to compromise the system. 

This brings us to the ”flat enterprise network.”  Traditionally, enterprise networks have been configured for any-to-any connectivity; any node in the network could send a message to any other node.  The latency and bandwidth between any two nodes was roughly the same as the average across all nodes.  Often, and at least by default, they have been operated at a single level of trust.  That is to say, all nodes in the network were assumed to be benign, orderly, and well behaved. Nodes were not expected to have to protect themselves from traffic that originated on the network or question the origin address.  It is this configuration that leaves the enterprise vulnerable to lateral compromise with little more than one compromised system or user credentials.  

The alternative and safer network is referred to as ”zero trust.”  All nodes are assumed to be mutually hostile.  Traffic may flow only between specified pairs, e.g., user to application or client to server. Origin addresses are not trusted but must be authenticated.  Some cost in latency or bandwidth is tolerated for authorization of the connection and mutual authentication of the nodes. This kind of network is resistant to lateral compromise; a compromised node can attack only the nodes to which it is allowed to send traffic.  Even those nodes will treat it with suspicion and may require evidence as to its identity.  

There are a number of ways to restrict the flow of traffic to accord to this policy.  The first and most obvious is to provide only links between authhorized nodes; easy for two nodes, illustrative, but it does not scale even to a small enterprise.   However, the others simulate this illustration, usually through the use of encryption, e.g.,virtual local area networks, VLANs. virtual private networks, VPNs, and software defined networks, SDNs.  Note that in SDNs, users are included as ”nodes.”  Note also that to be most resistant to attack, connections should be at the application layer.  Applications are the nodes of interest and, contrasted to, for example, operating systems, have the smallest attack surface, i.e., the user interface.  

So, to summarize, the traditional use and configuration of desktops leave the enterprise vulnerable.  While awareness and strong authentication, remain essential practices they are limited in their effectiveness.  E-mail and browsing should be isolated from mission critical or otherwise sensitive applications.  The environment should be resistant to persistent changes to programs or procedures from application data; least privilege access control.  Network traffic should be encrypted end-to-end at the application layer; prefer software defined networks to VPNs to VLANs.  
 




Friday, February 1, 2019

Limitations of Two Factor Authentication

In an opinion piece in the New York Times, Professor Josephine Wolff of Rochester Institute of Technology describes a “phishing” attack in which two factor authentication might not protect you.  The bait asks you to click on it to go to an application that you are authorized to use.  Clicking on the link takes you to a site that mimics the application.  It mimics the prompts for the user ID, the password, and the one-time password, all three of which it uses to logon to the real application in your name.  Unfortunately, to some readers this may read like a general limitation of two factor authentication rather than a special case.  Some users might conclude that two factor authentication is not worth the inconvenience.  

Consider some of the conditions for the success of this attack.  First the bait must be for an application to which you actually have an account.  Second, the bait must be sufficiently well crafted to convince you that you want to respond.  Third, you must respond, not by going to the application the way you usually do but by clicking on the bait.  Of course, this is very bad practice.  

While if this man-in-the-middle attack is sufficiently well designed as to fool you, it has only stolen a session that you started. Unlike simple passwords it cannot be use to initiate a session on its own.  It has not exposed you to fraudulent reuse of your credentials.  It cannot be used to compromise other systems “laterally” within the enterprise.  

Well designed applications will not permit the attacker to turn off the two factor authentication without requiring a second one time password and will confirm any such change out of band.    

This is not the only possible successful attack against two factor, depending upon the implementation.  Consider Google’s implementation.   It offers the user five different choices of how to get the one-time password (OTP), in an SMS text message, in an e-mail message, in spoken language over the phone, from a software generator, or from a hardware token (Google Titan).  All of these must ensure that the OTP come from and get to the right place.

For example, SMS text and voice over the phone rely upon legitimate user’s control of the phone number.  E-mail requires that the OTP be sent to the legitimate user’s address.  Attackers have been successful in duping the carrier support personnel into pointing the the number to a new SIM or phone that they control.  They have also been successful in duping the application support personnel to change the number, or e-mail address to which they send the one time password.  Good practice requires that the change be confirmed out of band.  After compromise the user will not get one time passwords, or perhaps even phone calls, that they are expecting.   

Even software and hardware tokens rely upon the right token being associated with the legitimate user.  In order to compensate for lost or broken tokens, most applications provide for enrolling new tokens.  An attacker might succeed in duping support personnel into enrolling their token in place of the one heldby the legitimate user.  

Note that all of these attacks require work and special knowledge.  None of them guarantees success, none of them scales well.  Those that permit fraudulent reuse, also deny the legitimate user access and should be obvious.  

Two factor authentication using one time passwords is a special case of “strong authentication,” defined as multiple forms of evidence at least one of which (e.g., one time passwords) is resistant to replay.  Note that security can be increased by using more forms of evidence.  This at the expense of convenience.  

Strong authentication should be preferred for most applications.  Simple passwords must be used only for trivial applications.  All security mechanisms have limitations that we must understand and compensate for but that does not make them unuseable.  We must not permit the perfect to become the enemy of the good.  

Friday, October 5, 2018

The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate U.S. Companies - Bloomberg

Bloomberg Story

This is a ”developing story.” It has the reputation of Bloomberg and its reporters behind it, and the story has been updated to speak to its sources.  However, both Apple and Amazon have denied the roles attributed to them. While it originated months ago, the government has been silent. We need to wait for verification from the government. However, we should use the time to think about what to do assuming that the story is verified. What do we do in the face of un-trusted and potentially hostile hardware?

It is time to abandon the password for all but trivial applications. Keep in mind that passwords put the user and the system or application at risk.  Steve Jobs and the ubiquitous mobile computer have lowered the cost and improved the convenience of strong authentication enough to overcome all arguments against it.

It is time to abandon the flat network. Secure and trusted communication now trumps ease of any-to-any communication. It is time for end-to-end encryptions for all applications. Think TLS, VPNs, VLANs and physically segmented networks. Software Defined Networks put this within the budget of most enterprises.

It is time to abandon the convenient but dangerously permissive default access control rule of “read/write/execute” in favor of restrictive “read/execute-only” or even better, “Least privilege.” Least privilege is expensive to administer but it is effective. Our current strategy of “ship low-quality early/patch late” is proving to be ineffective and more expensive in maintenance and breaches than we could ever have imagined.

Finally, we must consider abandoning the open and flexible von Neumann Architecture for closed application-only operating environments, something more like iOS or the IBM iSeries with strongly typed objects and APIs, process-to-process isolation, and a trusted computing base (TCB) protected from other processes.

Oh, I almost forgot. We must monitor traffic flows. Automated logging and monitoring of the origin and destination of all traffic moves from ”nice to do” to ”must do.”

These measures are now timely, whatever the facts of the Bloomberg story.  While nothing will completely protect one from using hostile hardware, these measures will raise the cost of attack and reduce the risk.  We know what to do. We described it generations ago. Do we have the will?

Friday, August 17, 2018

Limitations of One Time Passwords

Recently a man sued AT&T because his one time password was sent to the wrong phone, causing him to lose $24M in “cryptocurrency.”  To punish them, he asked for $200M in punitive damages.  This led to headlines talking about the “dangers” of relying upon SMS to deliver one time passwords.

These are not so much ”dangers” as they are ”limitations.” ”Nothing useful can be said about the security of a mechanism except in the context of a specific application and environment.” All security measures have limitations. Perfect security has infinite cost; we must not let it become the enemy of good security.

While one time passwords, whether sent from the server or generated at the client, are orders of magnitude more secure than reusable passwords, they still have limitations.  They must be properly associated with the user or his account.   Like most security measures, and as in this case, this association is vulnerable to social engineering attacks.

Some of you may have tried to register a new SIM or move an existing phone number from one device to another.  You can testify that it can be a pain; the carriers have stringent security procedures in place to resist fraudulent changes to your account. However, they have hundreds of agents handling provisioning requests and they are trained to be customer friendly. In pursuit of this, they can be expected to make mistakes. That is a limitation of using your phone and its number as part of your authentication scheme.

Note that if you do not get a one time password, or a phone call, or even a paper bank statement that you are expecting, you may have been compromised. Note also that the carriers are not the only targets of these ”social engineering” attacks. The attackers may try to get your account holder to change the phone number, e-mail or street address in your account record from your number to theirs. That is why responsible account holders will send you an out-of-band confirmation of all changes to your account record to both the old and the new address. Even hard tokens may be vulnerable to these attacks because the account holder must be able to respond to lost tokens by allowing you to register a new token. Again, not so much a danger as a limitation. Keep in mind that just twenty years ago, the scam was to request a postal address change.

While I use SMS for Google, Dropbox, PayPal, Amazon, my credit union, and my banks, I use a token for my brokerage and retrirement accounts. Note all of these offer me choice of SMS or tokens. ”Horses for courses.” Rest assured that I would not use SMS for $24M. In fact, I would never put all that in one account.

Even as users, we need to know the limitations of the things that we depend upon for security.  As security professionals, responsible for choosing, applying, and operating these mechanisms, it is mandatory.

Thursday, May 3, 2018

Blockchain Revealed

Many of you must be frustrated following so many links about blockchain without finding out what it is, how it works, or what it is good for.  While it was invented a quarter of a century ago by Haber and Stornetta, it has recently been popularized by its most famous application, Bitcoin.

One might well ask why anyone might choose to write on something where so much has already been written.  The answer is that finding the answer to my three questions has proved to be difficult.  In this blog, I will attempt to answer those three questions but to the extent that I fail, I hope that readers will follow up with questions.

A blockchain is a collection of digital objects related in such a way that changing any one of the objects will be obvious and changing all of them in a non-obvious way is computationally infeasible.   Thus, it is a data integrity mechanism.  It is an example of a zero knowledge proof, i.e., making a demonstration without prior knowledge or pre-arrangement.

The objects are “chained” in such a way that object N includes a hash of object N-1 and its hash is included in object N+1.   The hash of the last, or latest, object in the chain depends upon, is an arithmetic function of, the content of every object in the chain.  Therefore, one can demonstrate that the chain is complete and that no objects have been altered.   We also know that object N-1 existed before N and N before N+1.

This works for any set of similar digital data objects.  The objects determine the application.  For a simple example, the objects might be the entries in a journal, or entries in a database.  More complex examples might include a digital record for all the transactions of a digital currency, bills of lading, warehouse receipts, or public records.

Blockchains enable anyone to demonstrate, by recomputing the hash of the last object, the integrity of the data. Therefore many applications may not require or rely upon a trusted party or access control of the data.  On the other hand, demonstrating the integrity of the chain is computationally intensive so blockchains work best for applications where the number and size of objects is low.  Said another way, blockchains may not scale well.

Note that trusted third parties, such as banks, often assume risk and collect fees for their role; disintermediating them can reduce cost.  For example, one might be able to transfer large sums internationally more cheaply using digital currency than by using orders on central or correspondent banks.

Thursday, March 8, 2018

The Use of SMS for Strong Authentication

NIST and others have discouraged the use of SMS for strong authentication.  This is another case of the perfect as the enemy of the good. 

First, strong authentication using a one time password sent via SMS is dramatically more secure than a replayable password. Second, if you get a one-time password when you ask for it, you are safe.

The problem is not so much with SMS but with the (cell) phone number. There is a risk that an attacker can either change the number in your account, to which the one time password will be sent, to a number other than yours, or get the phone company to associate, re-assign, your number with their phone. In either case, you will not get the one time password when you ask for it. In the latter case, you will not even get phone calls. Whenever the cell phone number in your profile is changed, you will get an e-mail message asking you if you really did it.

Carriers have controls in place to resist fraudulent reassignment of numbers to new phones.  However, the large number of agents and their desire to be accommodating, makes them vulnerable to ”social engineering” attacks. 

The difference in risk between a one-time password sent to your phone and one generated on board is small, particularly when compared to the difference in risk between either and a reuseable password.

In certain circumstances, the difference in convenience may be great. I have ten different accounts associated with my cell phone number. If I get a new phone, all my accounts continue to work as they did on the old phone. The number has moved to the new phone. If I used an on-board password generator, not portable to the new phone, I would have to register the new password generator with each of the ten accounts. I have to do that by calling support, authenticating myself, and registering the new generator. Until I have done that, I cannot logon to or use the account.

If you think about it, the real risk is in provisioning of the phone number or the registering of the on board generator (e.g., VIP Access, Google Authenticator, RSA SecurID Software Token).