MasterCard to Eliminate Signatures

MasterCard has announced that in the US and Canada, it will no longer require signatures on credit card transactions.  (PINs will continue to be required on debit card transactions.)   MC says that this will be more convenient for the customer and that it will rely on other (unnamed) mechanisms and processes for security.  Let us look at some.

First, many issuers use computer aided mechanisms to detect fraudulent use by looking at such clues as location and other patterns of use.  Most of us have had calls from our banks checking on the legitimacy of activity.

In theory, the required signature resists fraudulent use of lost or stolen cards.  In practice, not so much.  Even when clerks reconciled the signature on the check to the one on the card, it was an imperfect mechanism.  In modern systems, where no one really reconciles the signature, the best that the mechanism can do is to permit the consumer to recognize disputed items that he really did sign. However, for the most part, issuers simply accept the word of the consumer that a transaction is fraudulent.  The signature does not come into play. 

The best way to resist the fraudulent use of lost or stolen cards is to check that a proffered card has not been reported lost or stolen.  This works well in the US and Canada, where most transactions take place on line.  In countries where many transactions take place off line, PINs are used. 

American Express CEO, Kenneth Chennault told President Obama that Am Ex detects many fraudulent transactions within 60 seconds by sending a notification of use to the consumer’s mobile or e-mail in real time. 

Bank of America and others resist fraudulent use by permitting the consumer to turn the card on and off using an app.  Again, works well where most transactions are on line. 

Android, Apple, and Samsung Pay resist fraudulent use by simply taking the card out of the transaction and substituting a digital token for the credit card number.  Lost mobile phones resist fraudulent reuse with PINs for security and biometrics, e.g. facial and fingerprint recognition, for convenience. 

On line merchants have never had the benefit of signatures but  can resist fraud by using PayPal or other proxies instead of accepting credit cards at check out.  Where the merchants cooperate and the consumer uses Ámerican Express at checkout, AmEx will prompt the user for a one-time-password sent to the users mobile.  This protects the merchant, the consumer and AmEx.  All of these resist “card not present” fraud. 

Only the brands and issuers really know how necessary and effective signatures and PINs are: they take the risk when they are not required.

The fundamental vulnerability in the retail payment system is the credit card number in the clear on the magnetic stripe.  Remains a risk to merchants and issuers but is only a nuisance to the consumer. 

In short, the future is mobile, tokenized, cordless, contactless, signature and Pin less, and secure. 

Chip and PIN Compared to Chip and Signature

As we begin on the long process of changing credit cards from the obsolete magnetic stripe technology to smart (EMV) "chip" cards, there has been a lot of criticism of the decision of the credit card issuers not to implement "Chip and PIN."  Much of this discussion has asserted that "Chip and PIN" is more secure than the chosen chip card and signature strategy.  Apparently this position is so obvious that it has stifled analysis.

I assert that Chip and PIN is only marginally more secure than Chip and Signature. It protects against the fraudulent use of lost or stolen cards. However, fraudulent use of lost or stolen cards is only a small portion of the fraud. The largest part uses counterfeit cards; chips resist counterfeiting.

For both the individual and the issuer, the best protection against fraudulent use of lost or stolen cards is to report the card lost or stolen. The individual is now protected against any use of the card. The issuer will revoke the card and is now protected against any online use of the card.

Note that the effectiveness of revocation depends in part upon the market. In the U.S., where most transactions take place online, it is very effective. In markets where the infrastructure is less robust and many transactions take place offline, revocation is less effective. Thus in the U.S. issuers are opting for Chip and Signature while in other markets Chip and PIN is chosen.

Note that only the issuers know what the losses are for fraudulent use of lost or stolen cards is, that is, how much fraud might be reduced by the use of a PIN on all transactions. It is fair to assume that they know what they are doing.

Some have asserted that, in the absence of the PIN, security will rely upon clerks to reconcile a signature on the transaction document to,the reference signature on the card.  For most routine transactions we do not rely upon the clerk to verify the signature or even to touch the card. While in some places we still sign a chit, at checkout stands we sign on a little tablet (I hate them.) No one ever checks the signature unless the transaction is disputed. Said another way, at least in the U.S., we rely mostly on possession of a current card to authenticate most transactions; both signatures and PINs are backup and there is little to choose between them?